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As digital technologies become more prevalent there is a growing
awareness of the importance of good security and privacy practices.
The tools and techniques used to achieve this are typically designed
with the living user in mind, with little consideration of how they
should or will perform after the user has died. We report on two
workshops carried out with users of password managers to explore
their views on the post-mortem sharing, security and privacy of
a range of common digital assets. We discuss a post-mortem pri-
vacy paradox where users recognise value in planning for their
digital legacy, yet avoid actively doing so. Importantly, our find-
ings highlight a tension between the use of recommended security
tools during life and facilitating appropriate post-mortem access to
chosen assets. We offer design recommendations to facilitate and
encourage digital legacy planning while promoting good security
habits during life.
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Human-centered computing → Human computer interaction
(HCI); Social content sharing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As digital technologies and ubiquitous computing become more
commonplace, we are increasingly defining ourselves by aspects of
our digital lives. To protect our digital data and identities, there is
a need for additional security mechanisms and behaviours, such
as password managers, which help prevent common opportunistic
attacks, and multi-factor authentication, which adds a second layer
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of protection to digital accounts. As such security measures become
more complex, there arises a question of how the data and identities
protected with these mechanisms are managed after the death of
the individual. This is particularly evident in the case of social
media technologies, which have an immediate and obvious need to
ensure that accounts representing deceased individuals are retired.
For example, it has been predicted that, with continued uptake, the
quantity of deceased Facebook users would number in the billions
before the end of the 21st century [37]. However, much less visible
to others are the digital possessions and accounts that are not public-
facing and the value of which, whether financial or sentimental, is
at risk of loss upon the owner’s death.
Presently, the act of making comprehensive plans for this digital
legacy is hampered by a lack of technological knowledge or means
and limited established social practices. Without an individual hav-
ing made such plans, their loved ones are unlikely to be aware of
the existence and whereabouts of all of their meaningful or valuable
digital assets, and may be left unable to access those that they do
know of. In cases where access is possible, they may be unaware
of the deceased’s preferences in terms of the continued privacy of
their data, and face the uncertainty of deciding when it is and is not
appropriate for them to access password-protected, or otherwise
private, information.
This study set out to begin understanding how technology might
be used to encourage and enable security-aware technology users
with active digital lives to make plans for their data and online
accounts in the event of death. Through two workshops, users of
password managers generated digital legacy plans and discussed
privacy implications for a variety of individual online accounts and
data. Using thematic analysis, this paper explores how people think
about the privacy and value of their data as it exists during life
and after death, and how the security of, and access to, such data
might change after a person has died. We highlight a potential for
increased difficulty in carrying out such plans when an individual
exhibits strong security behaviours. Building on the proposed plans
and obstacles identified by the participants, we present recommen-
dations for the design of digital legacy functionality such as that
found in password managers to more widely encourage this nature
of planning and to ensure that legacy plans remain unimpeded by
strong security habits. In doing so, this research seeks to contribute
towards an understanding of individual reasoning regarding digital
legacy planning, and represents an early step towards improved
control over personal privacy, cybersecurity and data management.
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Finding Meaning in Data
The extent to which digital items might be considered to constitute
part of one’s personhood or self is a subject with a rich research his-
tory, a prominent example of which is the work of Russell Belk. In
1988, prior to the advent of the internet, Belk argued that one’s pos-
sessions can form an integral part of how a person constructs their
sense of identity and formulates the narrative of their life - as he
phrased it, their “extended self” [4]. Twenty-five years later, he re-
considered this in the context of the notable changes brought about
by the internet and ubiquitous computing, generating a number of
key principles of how such things might affect the “extended digital
self” [5]. In doing so, Belk identified five categories of departure
from the original Extended Self argument that have been brought
about by digital advancements and resultant social changes. Digital
entities may have no physical representation, what he referred to
as dematerialisation. New technologies further offer reembodiment,
with avatars or personas used to represent their identity. The nature
of how and what people share about themselves changes, along
with how an individual can control sharing of personal informa-
tion by others. Social media and other communication tools offer
co-construction of self, with important life moments or media able
to collect a digital patina through interactions such as messages
and comments. Finally, digital entities can represent a distributed
memory of life histories, memories and personal narratives.
When considering traditional components of the extended self,
sentimental value can become attached to simple and common ob-
jects, which in turn presents an opportunity for some sense of self
to be transmitted from one person to another through the gifting
of meaningful objects. Spence [42] considers how this process of
giving something with attached or embodied meaning – what she
terms “inalienability” – might be found or replicated in the context
of digital possessions. Digital items, unlike physical items, can often
be duplicated and could be shared with any number of recipients.
What gives them meaning, and forms a distinction between gifting
and sharing, is the thought process behind why a specific digi-
tal thing might be given to this particular recipient. Objects with
inalienable traits tend to have attached meanings, histories or nar-
ratives, and the process of gifting such objects to another individual
is personal in nature. In this, Spence creates a distinction between
relational gifting (e.g. a one to one gift) and transactional gifting
(e.g. sharing a file with a group). Bringing this line of thinking into
the context of digital legacy, there is a need for viable options that
support not only the distribution of valuable or important assets,
but also the gifting of valued parts of the self in a way that fosters
more relational and inalienable bequests.
2.2 Management and Curation of Data
With the proliferation of new forms of digital activities and accumu-
lation of associated data and credentials, effective management of
digital assets can become a burden. Prior research has indicated that
most people take actions to store information for future use, with a
tendency to overkeep data [53]. Technology users can typically be
placed along a spectrum ranging from minimalistic tendencies of
data retention and organisation practices towards digital hoarding,
in which cases all data is kept in case it one day proves to be of
importance [34, 47]. Digital hoarding, as defined by van Bennekom
et al, is “the accumulation of digital files to the point of loss of
perspective, which eventually results in stress and disorganisation”
[46]. In the context of leaving a comprehensible digital legacy, such
behaviours may be detrimental to one’s ability to engage with a
planning process and express sufficient control over what happens
to that data after death.
2.3 Protecting Digital Data
The most commonmethod for protecting data and accounts is using
alphanumeric passwords. Over the past decade, it has become clear
that passwords do not meet modern demands, however, better al-
ternatives are yet to be implemented [20]. A well-known limitation
of passwords is their capacity to be shared (or the inability to do
so securely). For example, typical advice discourages users from
sharing passwords, as this can compromise the security of their
accounts [13]. However, prior work has shown that passwords are
commonly shared due to need [41], convenience [38], or for social
credit [11].
Another key limitation of passwords involves human cognitive
limitations. While remembering a handful of passwords may be fea-
sible, users are currently required to remember passwords for an av-
erage of 26 regular accounts [39], although the number of accounts
could easily reach hundreds when considering less frequently vis-
ited accounts. In order to manage this, people take shortcuts in their
password usage, typically resulting in a negative impact on the se-
curity of systems. Workarounds include reusing passwords across
accounts [43, 52], which risks an account compromise leading to
other accounts being compromised [22].
It is becoming common for people to use mobile devices for
browsing the internet. This means using passwords on these de-
vices to log into accounts, yet touchscreen mobile devices make
the creation and use of complex passwords frustrating and less
likely [29], compounded by the fact that users already fail to create
strong-enough passwords [45]. These limitations clearly signal the
need for more usable solutions. Because of these issues, academics,
professionals, and governments encourage users to take up extra
security measures (e.g. [2]). These include password managers –
software that can generate complex unique passwords, and, more
importantly, store them so that users do not need to remember
them.
2.4 Digital Identity Management
A consequence of using tools for the tracking and storage of online
credentials is that, through the collection of the various aspects of
one’s accounts, a representative picture of their digital footprint –
or part of it – is formed in a single location. Password managers
present to the user a rare opportunity to peruse, manage and review
this representation, often with features for sorting those accounts
into folders, annotating them, sharing selectively with others and
assigning contacts to be granted emergency access privileges. As
such, they may be seen as a source of metadata regarding a person’s
online assets, irrespective of their capacity to provide authenticated
access to those resources. Prior research has considered the poten-
tial value of metadata in understanding and engaging with large
quantities of accumulated digital information, and how such data
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may be meaningful to others, including generations to come [17].
Others have considered how, for some individuals, such as trans-
gender people, there may be strong personal reasons to curate or
otherwise express control over digital identity [18].
Increasingly, the distinction between a person’s data and their
online credentials can become blurred. Recent design work has
confronted the challenges behind keeping and discarding personal
data in a "post-cloud" context , wherein data is not considered to
be limited to a device or location, but exists in some combination
of cloud and devices [48]. Where data is tied to a person’s identity
rather than to the physical device it is stored on, the challenge of
maintaining order becomes pressing. Their study found that some
participants favoured individual control over what is kept or deleted,
and others preferred automated alternatives. Ultimately, they derive
themes that highlight personal responsibility in managing one’s
own data, the burden of doing so, and the importance of context in
finding appropriate mechanisms of personal data curation.
2.5 Data after Death
The development and discussion of effective mechanisms of defin-
ing and delivering a working digital legacy plan has been consid-
ered by a range of HCI research and commercial products and
services (e.g. [21, 25, 40]). These include specially-designed estate
planning services, letters of instruction attached to an individual’s
last will and testament, software designed specifically for digital
legacy management [15] and the use of password managers as a
means of directly passing credentials [8]. It has been noted that
there are distinctly opposed views in respect to how this ought
to be done, particularly regarding preferences towards deletion or
towards preservation [26], however in either case there has been
little success in designing approaches that are both technologically
feasible and sufficiently accessible for the general population to
engage with the process. Brubaker et al. emphasise the burden of
responsibility placed on the recipients of digital inheritance, and
propose that instead of considering such individuals as inheritors
or beneficiaries, the term steward is more appropriate [7].
In addition to logistical concerns relating to the transmission of
passwords and data, there are also broader changes that should be
considered regarding inheritance and dying in the digital age. These
include novel approaches to designing for digital remembrance [3],
digital archiving of sentimental objects [23], new ways of social
mourning [15, 51], the stakeholders involved immediately follow-
ing death [32], and the extension and preservation of personhood
through technology [28, 50]. Underlying this are questions regard-
ing what is the nature of privacy after death, which is typically not
treated with the same reverance as privacy during life [12]. This
also relates to a further question of how digital remains should be
treated, with some arguing for post-mortem data to be considered
as “the remains of an informational human body” and that the han-
dling of such data should be considered under ethical frameworks
similar to those used in disciplines such as archaeology [37], and
others going as far as to declare a moral duty for the preservation
of such artefacts [44]. Some argue that informational remains are
more sensitive than the human body itself, and protections that
exist for the body after death (e.g in relation to organ donation)
should be extended to include digital elements [9].
The concept of privacy after death is sometimes known as post-
mortem privacy. Our usage of the term is in keeping with the usage
of Edwards & Harbinja, who use it to describe “the right of a person
to preserve and control what becomes of his or her reputation,
dignity, integrity, secrets or memory after death” [12]. However,
while it may be considered a right by some, data protection regula-
tions typically apply only to living individuals [19]. Furthermore,
attempted post-mortem access to data that is stored according to
the Terms of Service of an online provider may prove difficult, as
many prohibit user assignment of rights and do not allow users to
share login credentials [31]. Even in cases where service providers
make some allowance for inheritance of user data, the opportu-
nities are limited. In the case of Facebook, the process relies on
the user naming their legacy contact prior to death and allows no
assignment of rights if this has not been done [30]. While legal
innovations are underway in some countries (e.g. RUFADAA in the
US [49], the Digital Republic in France [1]), many challenges exist
for those attempting to legally access personal data associated with
a deceased individual and it remains a legal grey area [30].
A recent survey of technology users in Israel reveals a range of
personal opinions on whether access should be granted to personal
email, social networking and cloud storage accounts after death,
with 45% - 50% of those surveyed indicating a preference for some-
one to have full access to their accounts, 31% - 36% expressing that
all access should be denied, and the remaining approximate one-
fifth showing a preference for some degree of partial access [33].
An implication of this division of opinion is that without explicit
post-mortem privacy preferences, most next of kin are unlikely
to be in a position where they can safely assume the appropriate
course of action regarding an individual’s digital remains. Further-
more, security mechanisms may facilitate or prevent access to data
in unintended ways.
It is also important to acknowledge that privacy and the appro-
priateness of access to data is not always clear cut and depends
heavily on situational and relational contexts. The concept of “con-
textual integrity”, as developed by Helen Nissenbaum, rejects the
notion that some things are implicitly private and others are not
[35]. Rather than some data or information being sensitive and
others not, or some data being private and some public, contextual
integrity considers the flow of data, and how appropriate that flow
of data is given its context. For example, whether it is appropriate
for data to be transferred to a certain recipient, and further, when
is that transfer appropriate. Viewing post-mortem privacy from
this contextual perspective illustrates the potential complexities
that are involved in attempting to plan one’s digital legacy, and
the difficulties that may interfere with adequately defining privacy
preferences. Our research takes a qualitative approach, seeking
to identify some of the reasoning behind granular post-mortem
privacy preferences, how they might be defined and executed, and




Our study is based on discussions from two workshops, in which
participants were asked to collectively decide on a post-mortem
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plan for a variety of common forms of data and online accounts,
before discussing the challenges of digital legacy more broadly.
3.2 Participants
The use of password managers was considered to be essential cri-
teria for participation. In restricting participants to those who use
password managers, this recruitment process was intended to in-
crease the likelihood of attendance by individuals with active digital
lives and who are security and privacy conscious. In order to locate
appropriate participants, the research was advertised within the
School of Computing at Newcastle University. In inviting students
of the School of Computing, there was anticipated to be a higher
incidence of computer and technology literacy and interest. It is
important to acknowledge that this is by no means a representa-
tive sample of the population, but rather a targeted and deliberate
selection of individuals who are likely to be engaged and informed
about relevant online technologies. Participants were invited to
attend if they used any type of password manager, and offered a
small shopping voucher as a token of gratitude for their attendance.
A total of 14 participants took part in the research. Two hour-
long workshops were held, each attended by 7 participants. The
first workshop consisted of 4 males and 3 females, and the second
consisted of entirely males. All participants were connected with
computer science, either at undergraduate, postgraduate or post-
doctoral level.
3.3 Pre-attendance questionnaire
Prior to attending the workshops, participants were invited to take
part in a short, optional questionnaire. No identifiable data was
collected during this questionnaire, and it was treated as a priming
activity and a way for the researcher to have an awareness of the
typical password manager usage patterns of those attending the
workshops. The questionnaire revealed that participants used a
range of password managers, and 8 were current or past users
of Lastpass. The number of stored credentials per person ranged
from 25 to 650, with half of the respondents reporting at least 100. 4
respondents reported taking regular action to review the contents of
their password manager, including sorting into folders, deactivating
old accounts and updating passwords. A variety of reasons were
offered for their use of password managers, including improved
security, convenience and as a memory aid.
3.4 Workshop materials
With the aim of exploring how password managers may be seen
as gateways to a person’s digital self, these workshops were de-
signed to exemplify a wide spectrum of digital entities and generate
discussion around the privacy and meaning associated with each.
Digital accounts, data and files that both would and would not be
likely to be represented within a password manager were included
as part of this. These were printed on cards, forming a deck of
30 cards in total. Cards included well known social networking
sites, such as Facebook and Twitter; common digital tools such as
email and cloud storage; online services used for activities such
as banking, gambling and dating; digital purchases/leases such as
e-books, video games and music streaming services; individual files
Figure 1: An annotated digital entity card
or folders that might be stored locally or on a cloud service; and two
physical devices - the personal computer and the mobile phone.
3.5 Procedure
In order to encourage all participants to contribute to the conver-
sation, and promote orderly and balanced discussion, the cards
were used as part of a turn-based activity. The process for doing so
was for each participant in turn to draw a card and read it aloud,
and for the group to discuss whether the card should be placed
under either plan, hide or ignore, with the person who drew the
card to make a final decision on behalf of the group. Cards filed
under plan represented items for which there ought to be a plan
in place relating to access, ownership, sharing or deletion in the
event of the owner’s death. Those placed under hide were seen as
fundamentally private and their existence should be kept secret
and deliberately excluded from any plans. All other cards were to
be placed under ignore, signifying no strong feelings about the fate
of those assets in the event of death.
After approximately 45 minutes of discussion prompted by this
card activity, the moderator turned the conversation to digital
legacy more broadly. As it was unclear beforehand how long par-
ticipants would take to arrive at a decision for each card, more had
been produced than were expected to be required. In both work-
shops, cards frequently prompted long discussions and debates, and
ultimately only a portion of the provided cards were discussed (16
and 9, respectively).
3.6 Analysis of the workshops
The audio from the workshops was transcribed and analysed in-
ductively using thematic analysis following Braun & Clarke [6].
The data was not analysed with an aim of seeking an objective
truth or reality about the nature of privacy and the importance of
data, but rather in an attempt to understand the individual views
of the participants and how their values and needs might affect the
challenge of secure digital legacy planning. Both workshops were
coded in their entirety, and considered in terms of the meanings and
values expressed by participants as part of their decision-making
process as well as the specific decisions and suggestions that they
arrived at. These are presented as individual sections in this paper,
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Figure 2: The final layout of the 16 cards discussed in work-
shop 1.
with the Findings section presenting the themes constructed from
across the data set, and the Design Considerations section identify-
ing some specific ideas and suggestions which are not necessarily
found throughout the data but rather in specific instances, such
as in discussions about how email accounts should be handled or
what the role of password managers is. Presented in the Findings
below are three themes derived from the thematic analysis: Death
as a privacy transition point; the post-mortem privacy paradox and
it’s a bit of a grim thing to be doing. The subsequent design consid-
erations section can best be understood as a curated selection of
practical issues, barriers and solutions identified by our participants
when challenged to plan for a given digital entity.
3.7 Ethics
Research that involves human participants in any way requires
careful ethical consideration, and research that involves consider-
ations of mortality and bereavement should be approached with
sensitivity [27]. To do so, the research process was designed to
avoid direct confrontation with personal experiences of this nature
at this formative stage. The workshops were therefore designed in
a way that prompted group discussion about primarily hypothet-
ical considerations, leaving individuals with the freedom to offer
personal insights and experiences only when they felt comfortable
doing so.
Participants who identified as having recently experienced a
bereavement, were suffering from a serious illness or who were
otherwise likely to be upset or distressed by discussions relating
to death were advised not to take part. A second moderator was
present at both workshops in order to assist with any unexpected
participant distress. Participants were advised that the topic of the
research involved what happens to our digital assets when we die
on multiple occasions: during advertisement of the research; via
email prior to attendance; in person on their attendance at the
workshops and on paper via the information sheet and consent
form. They were further aware that they could withdraw from the
research at any time without penalty.
The research described in the following sections was conducted
following ethical approval via Newcastle University’s ethics proce-
dure.
4 FINDINGS
4.1 Death as a privacy transition point
In considering the plans that are, or are not, necessary for the wide
variety of accounts and forms of data presented to them, the first
consideration for any given digital entity tended to be an assessment
of its inherent privacy. The logical approach to this was frequently
to seek continuation of the privacy granted to that entity during life;
the privacy level attributed to it can then be treated as a reflection
of intended privacy after death.
I find it an interesting thing, because, if you look at
your email account right now, you would assume that
nobody else except you is able to access it, so why
would that change after your death - P10
In some cases, such as for P10, quoted above, this is an assump-
tion arrived at naturally, but not described as a consideration that
they have made explicitly regarding their post-mortem privacy.
One’s email account is password protected and typically not ac-
cessed by any person but the owner, so there is no initial expectation
of a change to this privacy level. This is not necessarily indicative
of a belief that the data should in no circumstances be accessed
after death - in fact, this participant goes on to express a prefer-
ence for access to be maintained by a trusted individual. For some,
though, treatment of data as private during life is a highly deliberate
indicator for continued privacy after death.
because, for me, anything I’ve made public is what
I want to be public. Anything that’s not public, I’m
keeping behind closed doors for a good reason - P6
In the case of P6, any data access that is not explicitly encouraged
- by way of already being in the public domain, accessible via shared
access or delivered as part of a digital legacy plan - is considered
to be an invasion of privacy. P6 outlines a range of careful secu-
rity measures undertaken in protection of this privacy, describing
himself as “extremely paranoid” in this respect. However, the as-
sumption that this level of privacy is assured and enduring after
death may not be entirely accurate. Much of the discussion gener-
ated in the consideration of the digital entity cards is illustrative of
a lack of confidence in continued privacy after death. Participants
describe how changes in security technology may expose their data,
or how next of kin or authorities may use legal means to gain access,
and therefore “just assuming that people wouldn’t be able to access it
afterwards might not be the thing” (P8). This is accompanied by a
lack of trust in large corporations such as Facebook and Google to
maintain data privacy or to act in the best interests of the individual.
Furthermore, in the event that data access is passed to a trusted
data steward, the security of the data may be reduced as a result of
the security habits of that individual.
I randomly generate every password, but then other
people I know reuse them, so if their MySpace account
gets cracked then that could be immediate access to
my inbox - P11
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The assumption that data privacy can and should remain the same
after death as it was in life is further complicated by various pro-
posed plans and preferences pertaining to the digital entity cards,
suggesting that one’s death may bring about a change in how some
of their data should be handled. For example, in discussing the
mobile phone, which presents complications as a potential access
point to many different accounts and data items, P2 comments that
“it’s weird, you have to be super paranoid with it while you’re alive,
but obviously once you’re dead you want it to be easy to transfer to a
really trusted person, but no one else”. Similarly, data that is restricted
during life is not necessarily intended to be restricted indefinitely.
Facebook, for example – I have a couple of folders
that are just from, back from school, when I’d take
loads of pictures, and I’ve made them hidden now, out
of no real desire to hide anything, I just don’t want
them public on my profile at the moment. But if I
passed away, then some people might say, ‘oh, do you
remember [P4] took these pictures, blah blah blah’,
and they wouldn’t be able to access them if I hadn’t
given somebody the ability to make my account a
legacy account - P4
In this way, one’s intentions regarding what they do and do not
choose to share publicly may be more of a reflection of their identity
as they wish it to be perceived at that particular point in time than a
statement about the fundamentally private nature of the data itself.
As P2 describes it, “when you’re alive, actually you don’t want your
old photos to be accessible, but when you’re dead, probably, it would
be nicer if they were”.
As well as scenarios in which data moves from more private to
less private at the point of death, there are also potentially cases
where the justification for the existence and consumption of data
expires upon an individual’s death. In discussing tracked location
data, for example that which is routinely gathered by Google, par-
ticipants voiced their discomfort with the existence of the data at
all.
I’m terrible, because I turned it off deliberately – turned
it off because I didn’t like the idea of it, but then, when
it made using Google Maps slightly harder one day, I
turned it back on again, you know - P13
This description of a trade off between a desired level of per-
sonal privacy and the value of services received reflects a form of
balance between the online service provider and the user. However,
upon the death of the user, this balance is disturbed, as the service
provider continues to have access to private data but is no longer
providing a service in order to do so. The participant thus expresses
a desire to have the data deleted after death that “comes from a
slight unease about it existing” (P13). This example illustrates how
one’s privacy choices in life may no longer be a true reflection of
their continuing privacy preferences after the point of death.
4.2 The post-mortem privacy paradox
Over the course of the data collection, much of the planning and
discussions revolved around the controlled destruction of private
data and the managed sharing of non-sensitive data. The majority
of decisions made about the prompt cards were some form of plan,
and most participants expressed some clear privacy interests and
wishes, both in favour of preservation and of deletion. In discussions
about the mobile phone, P2 declared that “I don’t know that there’s
a clear answer except that you’ve gotta do something, so you can’t
hide or ignore it”. Despite the hypothetical situation in which the
participants themselves are no longer living, personal information
– particularly that of a sensitive nature – is discussed as something
that is to be protected. This may be for the benefit of the individual
themselves, for example in the case of P1’s preference that “I don’t
want people, really, reading through my messages – not that there’s
anything dodgy or anything”. It may also be for the benefit of the
friends and family left behind, as expressed by P4.
definitely with like, the family movies and things, you
wouldn’t ever wanna lose, anyone else to lose access
to them - P4
Others expressed a preference for the removal of data whose
continued existence is hard to justify. For example, P13 questions
whether there is any value in preserving email data, before suggest-
ing that “maybe it’s the OCD in me, wanting to clean things up”. In
consideration of the potential contents of a cloud storage account,
which it was agreed might contain a wide variety of both valuable
and valueless data, participants found no difficulty in producing
examples of data that they considered to be in need of a plan.
P8: but there might be things like, you know, letters
to the bank or the tax people and stuff like that which
might be of use
P10: er, research, I have research data that I would
want others to have access to if I’m not able to access
it any more because I died, so I would have a plan for
that
However, despite the identified need for a comprehensive plan
for these items, very few of the participants had engaged with
digital legacy plans at any level. Even in the case of a participant
with an existing digital will, there were differences between the
existing plan and the reasoning exhibited in response to the digital
entity card task. P14 argues at first that the email inbox seems to be
a “dangerous thing” and should not be included in any plan, before
coming to the realisation that this is inconsistent with decisions
already made in real life.
I mean thinking about it, because I initially said hide,
in fact I do have a plan in place, so I do have a desig-
nated person that will have access to it - P14
In other cases, participants highlighted a certain need for a plan
but were forthcoming about having not completed this activity
themselves. P8 was clear that there is a “definite” need to plan
for cryptocurrency, but later shared with the group the absence
of a plan for his own cryptocurrency. Discussion during the card-
planning activity almost entirely consisted of statements of what
would, or should, be done with each of these commonly held digital
items, rather than sharingwhat they have done, or what theywill do.
In this way, discussion about post-mortem privacy and digital legacy
appears to conform to the ‘privacy paradox’, a known phenomenon
wherein the technology users’ privacy intentions are not reflected
in their actions [24, 36].
In addition to an overall inconsistency betweenwhat participants
spoke of as in need of planning and their own actions, there was also
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seen to be a problematic distinction between what they consider
to be important in the present and an imagined future in which
they have died and hence, no longer have an interest. For example,
despite repeatedly expressing a preference for personal information
to be “purged”, P11 remarks that “well, I probably won’t care, to
be honest, because I won’t be alive to see whatever someone does
with it”. P4 outlines a preference for illegally obtained files to be
destroyed, but follows this up by saying “there probably won’t be
any consequences – I’m dead”. When P9 outlines a concern that an
appointed data steward might get hacked and leak his data, other
participants suggest that being dead prevents this from impacting
him personally.
P14: you’re dead, though, remember
P8: yeah ... you can’t worry about it
This tendency to dismiss privacy as something that is only rele-
vant to the living has the potential to strongly demotivate actions
protecting personal privacy after death and direct planning efforts
entirely towards assisting those who they will have left behind.
However, the argument that nothing matters to the dead can be
applied to their loved ones as much as it can be applied to their
personal privacy – in both cases, it is what is valuable to a person
while they are alive that dictates the nature of any plans made.
Nevertheless, despite the various confirmations that participants
see value in their post-mortem privacy, discussions of hypothetical
scenarios in which they were no longer living were often framed
in terms of the interests of their loved ones, with their own values
dismissed as no longer relevant.
I’m sort of in two minds about it, personally, it’s either
‘who cares, I’m dead’, or ‘get rid of it’, but I guess that
suits... any dependents quite well, doesn’t it, because
you... might not want dependents finding out about
stuff that might be private - P11
4.3 “It’s a bit of a grim thing to be doing”
One of the primary obstacles to encouraging active engagement
with digital legacy planning is the nature of the subject matter. In
the absence of any knowledge regarding the timing of one’s own
death, contemplation of what will happen to one’s possessions and
identity when they die is unlikely to be prioritised.
nobody knows when they’re gonna die really, so it’s
kinda hard to plan for that eventuality - P4
Much like traditional will-writing, many people are aware that
they should have a will, and may intend to create one, but taking the
step of doing so requires some kind of motivation or prompt. P13
draws this comparison when asked how people might be encour-
aged to make plans for their digital legacy by suggesting that “the
same reason anybody would make a will would be the same reasons
why people would go through this kind of process”. This is reflected
in existing literature, for example Pfister outlines a common need
for a “motivational trigger” [40]. However, while there may be the
same overall reason for taking this action, the acts of creating a
traditional will and creating a digital will are distinct from one
another in how that action is completed. In the case of the former,
the activity is typically completed in a single session and can be put
out of mind afterwards. In the case of the latter, the information
contained within the will is much more fluid and in need of more
frequent but less exhaustive review.
[a will] is, in a way it’s expensive, yeah, but it’s rela-
tively easy, like you go and see someone, they write it,
you check it, that’s it. Doing all this is quite – I mean,
I’ve done all this, and it takes a long piece of time, and
you’ve got to be continually updating it as well - P14
This continual updating presents a challenge in two ways: it is
time consuming, and it also requires constant re-engagement with
a subject matter that is not only upsetting, but also somewhat taboo.
P13 highlights this in consideration of the idea of collecting digital
legacy preferences as a matter of routine, remarking that “it’s a bit
of a grim thing to be doing, like ‘email’, ‘username’, ‘what happens
when you die”. The combination of these two deterrants is enough to
prevent most people from engaging, particularly those who, unlike
this sample of computer science students and graduates, have little
interest in computers or technology.
[amateur computer users] can’t be bothered to faff
around with their computer, never mind their ac-
counts, so why would they spend the time doing all
of this - P11
In this respect, a wide-reaching solution must have the capacity
to make the process much quicker, easier and more accessible to
the wider population.
4.4 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
4.5 Sharing vs Bequeathal
A point that was frequently made in both workshops was that,
in many cases, the meaningful data that a person might seek to
preserve is not of a fundamentally private nature. Photographs, for
example, were returned to repeatedly throughout the data collection
as an example of data that is highly valuable and whose loss should
be avoided. While there may be cases where photographs exist
that should not be shared until after death, in the majority of cases
there is no detriment to the sharing of these photographs while
the owner is still living. Therefore, the task of ensuring continued
access to this data after death can in some cases be reframed to
become a task that is completed by the owner during life as an act
of sharing rather than an act of bequeathal.
...if you are using cloud storage you’ve always got the
option to share files or folders, so I feel like it would
be better to go down the route of sharing stuff while
you’re alive - P6
This approach to ensuring the continuation of our valued data
shifts the expectation of the individual from needing to explicitly
plan for the moment of their death to a more general inclination to
share important data. However, while this was recognised as some-
thing that should be taking place, it was also agreed that “the reality
is a lot of us never do what we should do in terms of organising our
data while we’re alive” (P2). The problem, therefore, may lie within
the difficulties associated with good data management practices
and the obstacle of establishing agreed-upon sharing mechanisms.
P11 speaks of his own abandoned attempts to establish such shar-
ing habits with his partner, who “has an iPhone and refuses to use
anything with, like, any other technology”.
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However, despite general agreement that sharing in the present
is not utilised to the full extent, in the case of protecting sensitive
information, participants described much more active control. In
discussing browsing history, participants felt confident in ignoring
data, as “a lot of people are probably already being proactive” (P8).
In this way, appropriate activity during life can prevent there being
a need for protective actions within one’s digital legacy plan.
so this is more something that you’d plan already,
right now, in the moment, like you... don’t wait for
yourself to die... to try to delete it - P10
4.6 Password managers
Given the central purpose of password managers in these work-
shops, both as a means of selective recruitment and a focus for
discussion, one of the main approaches discussed as a potential
solution is closely aligned with the existing functionality of pass-
word managers. Password managers exist as a software tool that
collects and passively organises credentials for websites and appli-
cations, fulfilling a similar task in pulling together a wide variety
of unrelated digital activities and assisting in their management. A
primary mechanism of this functionality is that as and when new
online accounts are created, a decision is made by the user as to
whether or not to store that credential in the password manager.
Naturally, given the framing of the workshops and the explicit
questioning regarding password managers, this functionality of
decision-making at the onboarding level tended to be used as the
basis for how technology might support a digital legacy process.
However, a number of discussion points highlighted challenges
associated with the use of password managers to plan for digital
legacy.
4.6.1 The need for granularity. At the time of writing, password
managers sometimes offer some form of emergency contact func-
tionality or credential sharing system. However, access granted via
an emergency contact will typically grant access to all credentials,
not a subset, meaning that use of such a feature for digital legacy
planning usually precludes the ability to control which elements
are accessible to the next of kin. Passwords shared during life via
a password manager have some degree of granularity, but rely on
those they are shared with also being a user of the same software
package and fail to accommodate cases where access is only appro-
priate after the original owner has died. Password managers have
an opportunity to provide functionality for a form of digital will,
in which – upon proof of death – distinct actions are taken with
particular accounts and files at the discretion of the decedent.
4.6.2 The need for review. Any given decision regarding a digital
entity that is made at the beginning of that entity’s existence may
change according to the ongoing use of that entity. For example,
P1 gives an example of a Reddit account, which through discussion
had been agreed might contain sensitive material:
... you sign up for a Reddit account and you don’t care,
and all of a sudden you do weird stuff and then you
go, ‘ok, actually, I need to hide that’, but you set it up
as ignore, or whatever - P1
The variance of online accounts in terms of sensitivity in this
way has been described in security research, such as Florêncio and
Herley’s categorisation of accounts according to potential conse-
quences of account compromise, ranging across five levels from
"don’t care" to "ultra-sensitive" [14]. Incorporating a contextual
integrity framing, it is reasonable to expect that the initial cate-
gorisation (a new account with little at risk) may change over time
due to unforeseen usage of the service, or corresponding lifestyle
changes. From a security perspective, this may support review activ-
ities regarding elements such as password strength. Equally, from
a post-mortem privacy perspective, the decision to share data or
credentials may also be best subjected to some form of review. As
the number of credentials stored by password managers can grow
to be large, this review activity has the potential to become over-
whelming. As P4 notes, “even with a password manager, managing
your passwords is a nightmare”.
4.6.3 Competition between software packages. A further compli-
cation can arise if more than one software package is used for the
same, or similar purposes. Traditional wills are such that only the
most recent is valid, however a digital will constructed using a
password manager would be under no such limitation. In cases
where multiple password managers are in use, there arises a ques-
tion of which represents the true intent of the deceased, and how
to resolve any conflicts. P4 notes that there is already such a con-
flict between her dedicated password manager and her browser’s
password manager functionality.
I don’t know what Lastpass holds, and what Google
holds, because both of them are incredibly invasive,
and it’s kinda hard to tell who’s in charge, when
they’re both being like ‘I’ve got the password’- P4
4.6.4 Additional security measures. While passwords are an au-
thentication technique ubiquitous across the internet and among
hardware devices, there are other mechanisms of determining iden-
tity in use that may conflict with a password-only digital legacy
plan. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is a mechanism that is
increasingly being used as an additional security measure, requir-
ing two or more separate factors for authentication – typically
something a person owns (such as a mobile phone) or that they
are (such as a fingerprint). Despite being a recommended security
technique, MFA suffers from poor adoption rates [10]. However,
our participants, who were more likely to show strong security
habits, identified some complications that may come about when
attempting to leave a digital legacy using a password manager.
I think it’s difficult, because my phone is essentially
my second factor, and I’ve got a wife, and she would
need access to my second factor for some of the im-
portant things - P1
In the case of mobile devices acting as the second factor, that
device becomes something that should be explicitly planned for as
part of this process. This may involve bequeathing the device itself
(if it is still in working order) and relevant unlock passwords/pins, or
potentially the provision of 2FA recovery codes and a plan to reset
or otherwise disable the device. In the case of the former, access is
granted to the entire device, which provides unintended access to
apps and websites that are signed in, precluding the ability to limit
the access granted to the recipient. For the latter, the user is forced
to create a complex plan that assumes knowledge on their own part
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and that of the recipient, and creates difficulties in bequeathing
a potentially valuable mobile device, such as a need to provide
proof of death in order to reset it. In either case, a consequence
of additional security measures is that the ability to simply and
effectively leave a digital legacy is impeded.
4.7 Email as a primary key
An alternative, or a complement, to password managers as a central
gateway point to one’s digital life is one’s email account(s). If one
has kept their registration details for their various accounts, the
email is a point of access to a large proportion of the set of online
services that a person uses, and is also commonly the primary
mechanism for resetting passwords. Consequently, the inclusion
of email in a bequeathed list of password credentials may result
in unintended access to accounts or data that were not explicitly
included, if that email address is the one that is associated with the
account.
if you have someone’s phone, and their email address,
you can basically become them - P2
As such, access to emails potentially gives a person even more ac-
cess to the digital possessions of the account holder than a password
manager. However, unlike password managers, there is not typi-
cally functionality for this information to be curated or controlled
in an effective way, leaving the individual with the responsibility of
manually removing sensitive aspects of their email contents. The
complexity and effectiveness of this task are likely to be strongly
impacted by the data management practices of the deceased.
4.8 The burden and sustainability of
stewardship
Common to the majority of discussed planning solutions was the
notion that an individual, or multiple individuals, would be assigned
the responsibility of carrying out any given plan. In some cases,
this holds a benefit for that person in that the data or credentials
passed to them are valuable, whether financially (as in the case of
cryptocurrency), logistically (e.g. important documents) or senti-
mentally (e.g. photographs). In other cases, the role involves the
deletion of data or other similar representation on their behalf. This
is already problematic when considering that initial burden of re-
sponsibility for carrying out planned legacy actions, but becomes
even more so when the long-term implications are considered. As
mentioned previously, there is an expectation that any private data
is kept secure in the long term. There is also a question of sus-
tainability – is it the responsibility of the steward to ensure the
preservation of inherited data, even to the point of including it in
their own legacy planning?
first of all, I’m being a burden to somebody else, so
there was an initial consent there which needs to be
negotiated, and secondly, what happens when they
pass on, do they pass it on to somebody else, do they,
and sort of eventually, like, your grandchildren have
got like fifteen accounts or something they need to
manage? - P13
Prior research has highlighted the nature of this burden, address-
ing the scale of digital collections and the size of the undertaking
in attempting to carry out wishes [7, 16]. An ideal digital legacy
solution would make provisions for this relationship between an
individual and their steward. Rather than simply naming an individ-
ual and outlining a plan, some consideration of the effort required
on the part of the steward should be encouraged and factored into
the plan. Alternatively, the named steward may instead be a part
of a professional service, relinquishing loved ones of the bulk of
responsibility.
P10: but you could also do it to a company, so that
that company could be, er Gmail for example, but it
could already be that it’s not a person but a company
and they probably do have these
P8: - or a solicitor, or something like that
Here, the distinction highlighted by Spence between transac-
tional and relational gifting becomes relevant [42]. For relational
gifts – to which there is attached some form of meaning or senti-
mentality – the gift of a digital asset may be less burdensome. The
acting of choosing to pass on a particular item can have value for
both the giver and the recipient, regardless of the value of the item
itself. However, for digital entities to which there is no such value,
the role of stewardship may be something that can be assigned or
transferred without such delicate considerations. For some legacy
plans, automation is described by our participants as the preferred
technique. In the case of an online dating profile, there was a prefer-
ence to make a plan for complete destruction of associated personal
data, but only if it could be carried out automatically – in the event
that this is not possible, the dating profile should be deliberately
excluded from any digital legacy plan. For others, automation was
considered as preferable for the sake of protecting loved ones in
their time of grief.
you know it’s likely that [the executor is] a close
person so they’re probably a bit upset that you’ve
passed away. I mean, is it the sort of thing where
maybe writing a script that they can just double click
an executable that reads a file - P11
In the case of tools such as password managers, automatically
executing a given action regarding an account (or generating a
template to simplify the process for the steward to do so) is a feasible
functionality. For certain actions – in this example, requesting that
a dating profile be removed from public view – this may reduce
the negative impact on the individuals given the responsibility of
taking care of a digital estate. This viewpoint echoes earlier work
by [48] in which the needs for personal control and automation are
balanced, and the importance of context is advocated.
4.9 A legal default
When asked how the wider population might be encouraged to
engage in digital legacy planning, the participants in workshop
two ultimately arrived at the conclusion that, for most people, this
is a difficult or even impossible task. They argued that there is
a responsibility for the government to provide a default, opt-out
process by which data is legally accessible to one’s next of kin.
what I would see as an ideal that there’s a- a default in
place, er legal default, that says that all data, all digital
data, your direct family gets rights, or one person gets
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direct rights to your digital data the moment you die,
unless stated otherwise - P10
Given that, prior to this point in the conversation, many of the
preferences stated had been in favour of controlled deletion, this
development was somewhat surprising. However, the participants
placed value in the simplicity of such a plan from the perspective
of an ordinary citizen, making the argument that those people who
have a strong preference then have the capacity to opt-out and
maintain an appropriate level of privacy. For those who have no
such strong opinions, a default such as this supports the needs of
their loved ones in accessing and preserving meaningful or valu-
able digital assets. In the view of these participants, an opt-out
approach would be an effective resolution for a wide proportion of
the population.
[the] pensions opt-out means that more people are
saving a pension than ever before - P8
Such a solution would introduce a range of privacy, technical,
cyber-security and legal questions that are beyond the scope of this
paper to discuss (see [19] for an argument against default trans-
mission of email data). However, it also fails to solve some of the
main problems associated with digital legacy planning. It would
fail to account for many of the preferences outlined throughout
the workshop activity, which included not only the preservation
or deletion of data, but also the future of various online accounts,
treatment of monetary assets and plans for notifying online follow-
ers and friends of death. It also assumes some existing knowledge
by the next of kin regarding what digital entities exist and why they
should consider seeking access to them or to the data contained
within them. By introducing a legal default such as this, there is
a risk that even less preparation and thought would go into this
form of planning, which is illustrated by P13’s assertion, gesturing
to the assorted digital entity cards, that “if that legal thing was in
place, I’d put all of those in ‘ignore’ ”.
5 DISCUSSION
Our findings challenge the notion that data privacy can, or should,
be assumed to remain the same after death. However, even as our
participants recognise this and argue for particular actions relat-
ing to individual digital items, we identify a reluctance to engage
with processes to influence post-mortem privacy outcomes. Much
like the broader privacy paradox, we identify a challenge of en-
abling and encouraging actions to control personal privacy after
death – including potentially relinquishing privacy in order to pass
on meaningful or valuable digital assets to others. What we have
described as the post-mortem privacy paradox reflects what we per-
ceive as a gulf between the recognition of post-mortem privacy
intentions and the completion of the actions that need to take place
in order to support the execution of those intentions. As a result, we
suggest that efforts to increase engagement in digital legacy plan-
ning may be more compelling when the value to others is stressed,
rather than the value for the individual. We argue that for some
digital items, the problem of navigating access after death can be
avoided by arranging and implementing access for specific individu-
als during life. In these cases, the challenge may be reframed as one
of organisation and communication, rather than one of planning.
Many of the findings we report on highlight individual differ-
ences in the values and meaning attached to digital entities. How-
ever, without explicit guidance regarding individual items, there is
a reliance on an all or nothing approach to post-mortem data access.
This produces a tension with existing cybersecurity behaviours –
if a person seeks to maintain absolute control over the security of
their data during life, they restrict their ability to transfer meaning-
ful or valuable digital assets in the event of their death except by
relinquishing their privacy entirely. In doing so, there is not only
a cost to their continued privacy, but the recipients, or stewards,
of their digital legacy are at risk of receiving an unmanageable
amount of data with little to no guidance. In the event of an attempt
at continued absolute privacy after death, without the involvement
of others there is a risk that the individual’s privacy will be dimin-
ished over time due to changes in cybersecurity measures and the
minimal or absent rights of privacy of the dead.
If digital legacy technologies are to overcome this issue, there is
a need for designs that enable granularity of digital legacy planning
while supporting continued security of that data. This problem
exists in two parts: the provision of usable software solutions, and
the social conditions necessary for users to engage with this kind
of continuous planning activity. In order for both of these parts to
be achieved, there is a need for security tools to take death into con-
sideration. Where tools are designed to pass access from a deceased
individual to a living beneficiary or data steward, how can the
privacy wishes of the deceased be communicated and implicated?
Conversely, where tools are designed for the protection of personal
privacy, what considerations are made for the continuation – or
adjustment – of that privacy after death?
5.1 Limitations & Future Work
Our research is a small-scale exploration, with a focus on a par-
ticular sample of more security-aware users. This means that our
findings are subject to some degree of bias and should not be taken
to be generalisable to the larger population. However, our focus
on potential conflicts between usable security and granular digital
legacy reveals a design space that is complex and underdeveloped.
There is a need to explore in detail the value of the discussed meth-
ods and findings with people with a more pressing need to make
clear digital legacy plans that do not risk their personal privacy.
There is also a need to consider the wider population and identify
how best to engage the average user in considering their digital
legacy and post-mortem privacy needs. This should extend to exam-
inations of differences across cultures and socio-economic status.
From a design perspective, there is a need to consider how best to
design password management tools to encourage not only initial
consideration of these issues, but also to promote ongoing review
and active curation of their digital identities in order to be able
to exert control over digital legacy with minimal cost to usability.
Finally, there is a need for a more thorough analysis of the extent
to which people’s post-mortem privacy planning behaviours fail to
meet their preferences.
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6 CONCLUSION
Through analysis of discussion structured around the preferred
future of individual digital assets after death, this research has high-
lighted some of the opportunities and obstacles to the development
and uptake of digital legacy processes. Notably, technology users’
planning actions are under-developed compared to their values
regarding the future of their data and digital assets, and strong
security behaviours were identified as a potential impediment to
controlling the future of one’s data after death. Considering digital
entities on an individual basis reveals nuanced variations regarding
potential planning activity, however the formation of such plans
is hindered by the required data organisation practices, privacy
awareness and willingness to engage with the notion of one’s own
death.
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